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Abstract
This paper offers an explanation for the discrepancy between Downs' prediction of
convergence to the median and the real world observations of nonconvergence. We modify
Palfrey (1984) by introducing valence characteristics and show that there exist equilibria with
entry in which the entrant may choose to be an extremist.
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In countries where there are established major parties and evanescent minor parties, a
common feature is that minor parties are usually extremists: they are either very progres-
sive or very conservative. In fact, we scarcely observe minor parties with intermediate
platforms. This observation makes an interesting subject of study.
This paper aims at providing an explanation of this observation. For that purpose,
we build on Palfrey (1984), in which there are two established parties and a potential
new party. Palfrey’s main focus is on the location of two major parties in the presence of
a potential entrant. He shows that in this situation, two major parties diﬀerentiate and
the new party enters between them. More speciﬁcally, if voters are uniformly distributed
along the interval [−1, 1], the two major parties locate at -1
2 and 1
2 and the minor party
chooses a location between them.
His main contribution is that in contrast to Downs (1957), two parties will not
converge to the median if there is a potential entry by a third party. This well reﬂects
the reality. In fact, we know of no country where two major parties take up the same
platform. The implication on the position of an entering party is, however, somewhat
counterfactual. As mentioned above, minor parties are usually extremists rather than
centrists.
Palfrey implicitly assumes that all parties are identical except for platforms. Voters
are only concerned about the policy and vote accordingly. But in reality, established
major parties enjoy huge advantage over new minor parties. Equivalently, a new minor
party suﬀers from disadvantage that results from various sources. To capture this, we in-
troduce the so called valence characteristics. They include, for example, charisma, name
recognition, greater campaign funds, incumbent advantage and so on. The existence of it
is obvious. If people did care only about policies, any candidate in the U.S. presidential
election who copies the policy of, say, the Democratic Party would get the same number
o fv o t e sa st h eD e m o c r a t i cP a r t yw o u l d ,w h i c hw o u l db ef a rf r o mt h et r u t h .
We show that if the advantage of the established parties is huge, the new party
chooses not to enter and the two big parties choose the same policy as in Downs. This
contrasts with Palfrey. If the advantage is not too small, then the two parties can again
deter entry by diﬀerentiating a little. Finally, if the advantage is too small to prevent
entry, it is shown that there exist equilibria in which the new party may choose to be an
extremist. Palfrey’s case obtains as a special case.
Aragones and Palfrey (2002) investigate two-candidate elections in Downsian setting
where one candidate enjoys an advantage over the other. Our paper can be regarded as
a complement to this work. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Steward (2001) analyze the ideo-
logical positioning of the U.S. House candidates and ﬁnd that challengers’ positions are
usually more extreme than incumbents’. Although not directly applicable to our paper
as they focus on two-party competition, their ﬁnding is supportive of the extreme en-
trants that arise in equilibrium in our model. The equilibrium in our paper is reminiscent
of the three-candidate equilibria in the citizen-candidate models by Besley and Coate
(1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). In those equilibria, a spoiler candidate who
does not have a chance of winning nevertheless enters the race to prevent the candidate
whom he likes less from winning.
12 The Model
Voters are uniformly distributed along the interval X =[ −1,1]. Candidates’ objective
is to maximize expected votes. There are two incumbent candidates L and R in the ﬁrst
period.1 Each of them simultaneously announces his policy choice l and r respectively.
There is a potential candidate E. In the second period, he decides whether to enter and
if he does, he also announces a policy choice e. There is no entry cost.
After the location of all candidates, voters vote for one and only one of the candidates.
Voting is sincere, i.e., people vote for the candidate who gives the highest utility. There
is no abstention. The utility of voter x ∈ [−1,1] when candidate K ∈ {L, R, E} wins
and implements the corresponding policy k ∈ {l, r, e} is given by
u(x,K)=−(x − k)
2 + εK,
where εK captures the valence characteristic of candidate K.2 A natural assumption
is that incumbents have advantage over the entrant. Here, we assume that the two
incumbents have the same valence values while the entrant has disadvantage, i.e., εL =
εR >ε E. We deﬁne ε = εL − εE (= εR − εE). We assume that if a voter is indiﬀerent
between the incumbents and the entrant, he always votes for the incumbents. Moreover,
w ea s s u m et h a ti fo n ei si n d i ﬀerent between the two incumbents, he randomizes.
We also assume that the entrant does not enter if he can get no votes. If he gets the
same number of votes from more than one policy, he randomizes over them.
3R e s u l t s
We are interested in subgame perfect equilibria and hence work backwards. Voters’ be-
havior is trivial; observing the announced policies, they simply vote for the candidate
that yields the highest payoﬀ. The strategy of the entrant candidate E is also straight-
forward; observing the announcements by the incumbents, he will choose a position that
will earn the most votes. If there are multiple optimal locations, he may randomize. Fi-
nally, the incumbents choose their locations fully aware of the entrant’s location strategy
in the second period and the voting behavior.
3.1 Voting




Note that since εL = εR >ε E, the only relevant valence value is ε. For example, a voter
x prefers L to R if
−(x − l)
2 > −(x − r)
2 ,
and prefers L to E if
−(x − l)
2 + ε>−(x − e)
2 .
1The name is of course irrelevant. The results hold up to the permuation of L and R.
2Any single-peaked, symmetric, and strictly concave function will yield the same qualitative results.
23.2 Entrant Candidate
Given ε and the incumbent candidates’ policy choices l and r, E determines whether
to enter and, if he does, what policy e to choose in order to maximize votes. We let
e ∈∅∪{f (·)}, where ∅ denotes no entry and f (·) is a density function over X.3 In
particular, if E has a ﬁnite number of optimal choices ˜ X = {x1,x 2,...,xn} ∈ Xn, then
f (·) is represented by a probability distribution P( ˜ X). In this case, ˜ e =( p1,p 2,...,pn) ∈ n
P( ˜ X)
o
means that E chooses policy xj with probability pj,j=1 ,2,...,n.
Depending on the values of ε, l, and r, E will want to reside in the left, in the middle,
or in the right. Since the incumbents have advantage in valence values, E will not want
to choose a policy e that is too close to l or r. In an extreme case, if E chooses the
same policy with one of the incumbents, he will get 0 votes no matter how little the
valence disadvantage is; being disadvantaged and having chosen the same policy with an
incumbent, he is completely dominated by the incumbent.
From now on, we assume without loss of generality that l ≤ r. We ﬁrst observe the
followings.
Lemma 1 Suppose E can get some votes by entering to the right of R. Then, if he
chooses to enter to the right of R, his optimal policy choice is r +
√
ε.
Proof. Suppose e>r .From −(x − r)
2+ε = −(x − e)
2 , we get xr = 1
2
¡




This voter is indiﬀerent between R and E. All the voters to the right of this voter vote















a n dt h i si sm a x i m i z e db ye = r +
√
ε.
Lemma 2 Suppose E can get some votes by entering to the left of L.T h e n ,i fh ec h o o s e s
to enter to the left of L, his optimal policy choice is l −
√
ε.
Proof. Suppose e<l .From −(x − l)
2+ε = −(x − e)
2 , we get xl = 1
2
¡




This voter is indiﬀerent between L and E. All the voters to the left of this voter vote for
E. Hence, E gets a vote fraction
1
2













a n dt h i si sm a x i m i z e db ye = l −
√
ε.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that E will choose a policy that is moderately diﬀerent from the
incumbents’ to overcome the valence disadvantage. We can immediately see that the
larger the disadvantage of E, the farther away he will move away from the incumbents
toward extremity.
3Formally, given ε, E’s strategy is eε :[ −1,1]
2 −→ ∅ ∪ {f (·)}. To avoid confusion, we denote the
randomization by ˜ e, and a realization of it by e.
3Lemma 3 Suppose E can get some votes by entering between L and R. Then, if he
chooses to enter between L and R, his optimal policy choice is 1
2 (l + r).
Proof. Let e be such that l<e<r .From −(x − l)
2 + ε = −(x − e)




e + l + ε
e−l
¢
, and from −(x − r)
2+ε = −(x − e)
2 , we get xr = 1
2
¡




Voter xr is indiﬀerent between R and E, and voter xl is indiﬀerent between L and E.
















This is maximized by e = 1
2 (l + r).
Lemma 3 shows that among the policies between l and r, the optimal choice for E is the
exact midpoint. This is due to the strict concavity of the utility function.4
Overall, there are three candidate points for E’s choice: l−
√
ε, 1
2 (l + r), and r+
√
ε.
Now, E’s decision is straightforward. Roughly speaking, he chooses the policy e that
gives him the most votes taking into account the above results. If the optimal policy is
unique, he will deﬁnitely choose it. Otherwise, he will randomize. If, for example, he
is indiﬀerent among l −
√
ε, 1
2 (l + r), and r +
√
ε, he will randomize over them. This










˜ e =( pL,p C,p R) implies that he chooses l −
√
ε, 1
2 (l + r),and r +
√
ε with probability
pL,p C,and pR (= 1 − pL − pC), respectively.
3.3 Incumbent Candidates
Given ε and taking into account the entrant’s optimal choice given above, the two in-
cumbents each choose l and r to maximize votes. In principle, we should consider L(R)’s
best response to each r(l) for various values of ε. One problem is that in some cases best
responses are not well deﬁned. For example, if ε =5and r =1 , then L will choose
l arbitrarily close to 1. This implies that when ε =5 , there is no Nash equilibrium in
which r =1 .5
Here, we get away with the formal analysis for getting the best responses by noting
that the two incumbents’ locations should be symmetric in equilibrium, i.e., l = −r. It
can be easily shown that if they are not symmetric, one is better oﬀ than the other and
hence the inferior candidate would always want to deviate. The next subsection presents
the results.
3.4 Equilibrium
We have the following equilibrium outcomes. We ﬁrst consider the case where ε is very
large.
Proposition 1 If ε ≥ 1, then l = r =0a n dn oe n t r yo c c u r s .
4If the utility function takes the form u(x,K)=−|x − k|+εK, then any e ∈ (l + ε, r − ε) is optimal.
5For a formal discussion, refer to the limit equilibrium in Palfrey (1984).









for any x,e ∈ [−1,1]. Therefore, E will not enter and this makes the setting equivalent
to that of Downsian competition. Therefore, convergence on the median is the unique
equilibrium. It is straightforward to see that no equilibrium exists if l,r ∈ [−1,0] or
l,r ∈ [0,1]. Hence, convergence on the median is indeed the unique equilibrium outcome.
If ε ≥ 1, then the disadvantage is so huge that the entrant cannot survive. Therefore,
virtually there is no threat of entry and the two incumbents produce a Downsian result.
Next, if ε is a little bit smaller but still signiﬁcantly large, we have the following
result.
Proposition 2 If 1
4 ≤ ε<1, then r =1−
√
ε, l = −r a n dn oe n t r yo c c u r s .
Proof. Given 1






























for any x, e ∈ [−1,1], and hence he will not enter. Given this, the incumbents will
maximally converge toward the median; otherwise, they can always move toward the
median and get more votes. Hence, l = −1+
√
ε and r =1−
√
ε are the unique
equilibrium location with no entry. Again, it is straightforward to see that at least one









Therefore, l = −1+
√
ε and r =1−
√
ε are the unique equilibrium location.
The idea is simple. If ε<1, then incumbents will not stand at the center because the
entrant will enter either to the left or to the right and get some votes. Hence, they
diﬀerentiate a little just to prevent entry. The values r =1−
√
ε and l = −r do exactly
this. Neither of them has any incentive to unilaterally deviate. If, for example, R moves
slightly to the right, then he will simply lose some votes in the middle without getting
anything. If he deviates slightly to the left, then he will encroach upon some of L’s votes
in the middle but by doing so will allow the entrant to kick in to his right. The loss is
larger than the gain and he is better oﬀ sticking to r =1−
√
ε.
Finally, if ε is too small, entry is inevitable. We have the following result.
Proposition 3 If 0 <ε<1
4, then r = 1












p, 1 − 2p, and p, respectively, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
2.
Proof. Now, no pair of (l,r) can deter entry. Suppose the incumbents choose l and






ε, and r +
√
ε<1. (It will be made straightfor-
ward from the following analysis that this set of inequalities is a necessary condition for





ε and r −
√
ε, and right of r +
√
ε. In each case, we know from the Lemmas that
E’s optimal locations are e = l −
√
ε, 1
2 (l + r), and r +
√
ε, respectively.
Now note that l and r should be such that E gets equal votes from the three areas so that
he is indiﬀerent among them. Suppose, by contrast, there is a unique vote-maximizing
position for E. If the location is l −
√
ε, then L can do better by moving to the left
appropriately, inducing E to move to either the center or the far right. If it is r +
√
ε,
R can deviate to the right and do better. If it is 1
2 (l + r), then either party can deviate
to the center slightly and gain more with E still in the center. Similarly, we can easily
show that incumbents have proﬁtable deviations if there are two optimal positions for E.
Therefore, the votes that E can get from the three locations should be equal in equilib-
rium. Now, to get the optimal location, take ε ∈ (0, 1
4) and let l = −r due to symmetry.
If E choose e = r +
√
ε, he gets a total vote of 1 − (r +
√
ε). (The extreme left case is
analogous.) The optimal center position is e = 1
2 (l + r)=0 .F r o m−(x − r)
2+ε = −x2






. Since l = −r, the total number of votes for E is r − ε
r. Solving
1 − (r +
√
ε)=r − ε












Given this, E is indiﬀerent among the three positions and therefore randomizes arbitrar-
ily. However, not all the randomizations are permissible in equilibrium. If, for example,
E chose l −
√
ε with higher probability than he did r +
√
ε,t h e nL would be strictly
better oﬀ moving slightly to the left so that E will choose 1
2 (l + r) with probability 1
since this will give L higher expected votes. This is true for any ˜ e =( pL,p C,p R) with
pL >p R. Similarly, R will deviate slightly to the right for any ˜ e =( pL,p C,p R) with
pL <p R. Hence, in equilibrium, the randomization should be symmetric, i.e., pL = pR.
Thus follows the randomization ˜ e =( p,1 − 2p,p).
Now, the advantage is too small and hence entry is inevitable. If the incumbents dif-
ferentiate too little, E will choose to be an extremist and take too many votes from
either L or R. If they diﬀerentiate too much, E will be a centrist and again take too
many votes from the incumbents. Hence, the incumbents will diﬀerentiate so that the
e n t r a n ti si n d i ﬀerent among the three locations l−
√
ε, 1
2 (l + r), andr+
√
ε.T h ev a l u e s
r = 1
4g(ε) and l = −r play this role. It is straightforward that neither incumbent has
any incentive to unilaterally deviate when E randomizes symmetrically. If, for example,
R moves slightly to the right, then E will for sure get into the middle, winning more
votes. This decreases R’s expected votes. If, on the other hand, he deviates slightly to
the left, the entrant will enter to his right with certainty and this loss far exceeds the
gain from the middle.
In summary, we have
1. If 0 <ε<1
4,l= −1
4g(ε),r= 1
4g(ε) and ˜ e =( p, 1 − 2p, p),
2. If 1




ε,and no entry occurs,







ε +1and ˜ e =( p, 1 − 2p, p), 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
2 is a mixed





























Figure 1: Optimal l, r, and e
Also of interest are the expected votes for each candidate. One would expect higher
votes for the incumbents as ε gets larger and the opposite for the entrant. The following
result conﬁr m st h i si n t u i t i o n .
Corollary 1 Let sI and sE be the expected fraction of votes for the incumbents and the




















These are calculated simply by dividing the total expected votes for each candidate by
the measure of the total population, which is 2.
Figure 1 shows candidates’ optimal policy choices. As shown above, if ε ≥ 1, we get
a Downsian result. For ε ∈ [1
4,1), two incumbents minimally diﬀe r e n t i a t ej u s tt op r e v e n t
entry. The degree of diﬀerentiation decreases in ε in this interval. That is, the larger the
advantage, the less they ﬁnd it necessary to diﬀer. For ε ∈ (0, 1
4), the entrant randomizes
o v e rt h et h r e ep o l i c i e sa n dt h ed e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation ﬁrst decreases and then increases
in ε.N o t et h a ti nt h i sc a s e ,t w od i ﬀerent levels of ε would result in the same position
of incumbent candidates. Also note that Palfrey’s case obtains as a special case when
ε =0 . In this case, E randomizes over ˜ X = {−1
2, 1
2}.
Figure 2 shows the vote shares in percentage for the incumbents and the entrant.
For ε ≥ 1
4, the entrant does not enter and the two incumbents divide votes equally. For
ε ∈ (0, 1
4), incumbents’ expected share increases and the entrant’s share decreases in ε,


































Figure 2: Expected Votes in Percentage
which is quite intuitive. When ε =0 , two incumbents each get 3
8 and the entrant gets 1
4
as in Palfrey.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
• Groseclose (1999) also brieﬂy addresses this issue. He says that the results are
qualitatively the same as in Palfrey. But this is true when we allow for only pure
strategies. We regard the entrant’s pure strategy to choose the midpoint as a
special case which cannot address the issue raised in the introduction.
• If the equilibrium p is close to 0, we can scarcely observe a centrist minor party.






, we will only observe
extremists.
• T h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ea r en ot w om a j o rp a r t i e sa d o p t i n gt h es a m ep o l i c yi m p l i e s ,
in our model, that the advantage ε is not so large as to completely deter entry
without diverging from the median.
• We assumed that E does not enter if he cannot get any votes. Since there is no
entry cost, we could have assumed that he chooses to enter at any position, which
does not aﬀect the incumbents’ strategy. Then, in equilibrium we would have a
minor candidate who virtually gets no vote. This might reﬂect the reality.
Our model is simple and abstracts from many real issues. We can think of some
possible extensions which will make this model more realistic. For example, we can
consider a game in which the entrant is now able to invest in his name value before he
8enters. Incumbents should take this into account when they announce policy. This way,
we can endogenize the disadvantage as a function of the original disadvantage. Another
extension is one in which the two incumbents are opportunistic whereas the entrant is
ideological. In this setup we can also think of an inﬁnitely repeated game, in which
reputation may play an important role.
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